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Since the beginning of the 2000s, the betting industry has been characterized by the
coexistence of quote-driven and order-driven markets. Similar to intermediary market
makers in quote-driven financial markets, bookmakers operate on their own account and
quote betting odds at which bettors can place their bets (Croxson & Reade, 2011). In
the order-driven market, betting exchanges serve as a marketplace in which buy and
sell orders are directly matched between bettors in a continuous double auction without
intermediaries (De Jong & Rindi, 2009).
This coexistence of market structures is puzzling. Betting exchanges face less oper-
ational risk (Koning & van Velzen, 2009), have lower information costs (Davies, Pitt,
Shapiro & Watson, 2005) and exhibit higher prediction accuracy in their odds (Smith,
Paton & Vaughan Williams, 2006, 2009; Franck, Verbeek & Nüesch, 2010). Nevertheless,
bookmakers continue to be successful. Bookmakers have not only managed to survive but
have also generated considerable growth in net revenues. For example, William Hill and
Ladbrokes, two major bookmakers in the United Kingdom, increased their net sportsbook
revenues between 2008 and 2012 from ↔42 million to ↔166.7 million (+297%) and from
↔61.7 million to ↔77.8 million (+26%), respectively.
This paper explains the coexistence of both market structures with the liquidity ad-
vantage of the quote-driven bookmaker market. Liquidity provision is an important task
of market makers in a quote-driven financial market (Demsetz, 1968). By guaranteeing
market liquidity at the odds quoted, the market maker fills the gap that arises from the
asynchronous order arrival of buyers and sellers. Hence, the market maker facilitates the
rapidity of exchange by offering narrow bid-ask spreads. In order-driven markets, however,
liquidity is provided by the flow of orders from market participants (De Jong & Rindi,
2009). An absence of a two-sided trading interest results in bid and ask prices that are far
apart, which increases transaction costs. Therefore, order-driven markets are expected to
perform poorly if liquidity is low (Demsetz, 1968).
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De Jong, Nijman and Roell (1995) and Huang and Stoll (1996, 2001) compare pure
quote- and order-driven financial markets and conclude that transaction costs are generally
lower in order-driven markets. Madhavan and Sofianos (1998), Friederich and Payne
(2007) and Venkataraman and Waisburd (2007) analyse hybrid financial markets in which
elements from order- and quote-driven markets are combined. They find that market
makers can improve the terms of trade when the liquidity offered by public limit orders
is low.
This paper uses the betting industry to compare the quote- and the order-driven
market structures. The betting industry offers the unique setting that identical betting
contracts are traded on both market structures simultaneously, i.e., besides the market
structure, everything else is equal. In related financial studies, differences in market
structures are often accompanied by differences in underlying assets and/or differences
in macroeconomic conditions across pure market structures (e.g., De Jong et al., 1995;
Huang & Stoll, 1996, 2001) or by complex interactions within hybrid market structures
(e.g., Madhavan & Sofianos, 1998; Friederich & Payne, 2007; Venkataraman & Waisburd,
2007).
Using matched panel data of over 1.8 million bookmaker and betting exchange odds
for 17,410 soccer matches played worldwide, we find that bookmaker odds are higher
than betting exchange odds if market liquidity at the betting exchange is low and that
bookmaker odds are lower than betting exchange odds if market liquidity at the betting
exchange is high. Bettors obtain higher odds and returns when using the quote-driven
bookmaker market if the cumulative trading volume at the betting exchange is less than
↔23,400 and/or if the quoted spread at the betting exchange is higher than 0.044 on
average. However, as bettor returns are still negative on average, bookmakers are able to
generate positive profits even when offering higher odds than the betting exchange.
The comparative advantage of the guaranteed liquidity in the quote-driven bookmaker
market is found both in cross-sectional analyses that use across-match differences, in panel
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analyses that use within-match differences and in dynamic panel analyses that include a
lagged dependent variable. Our results also hold in a subsample analysis in which odds
from up to 42 different bookmakers are compared to the betting exchange odds.
While Croxson and Reade (2011) and Ozgit (2005) argue that betting exchanges gen-
erally offer higher odds and bettor returns than bookmakers, we show that the oppos-
ite is true in illiquid markets. The liquidity advantage of the quote-driven bookmaker
market rationalizes the decision of Betfair to start offering quoted odds in addition to
the exchange-based odds as of February 2013 (Betfair, 2013a). Our findings also help
to explain the recent shift in financial market structures from pure quote-driven or pure
order-driven structures to hybrid structures that combine the advantages of both markets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the
two market structures in more detail and review the relevant theoretical and empirical
literature. In Section 3, we describe our data sets, which consist of bookmaker and
betting exchange odds from soccer matches. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis of
the guaranteed liquidity supply as a competitive advantage of the quote-driven bookmaker
market compared to the order-driven betting exchange market. Section 5 concludes.
2 Quote-driven and Order-driven Markets
The organizational structure of a market comprises the trading rules for instruments
(De Jong & Rindi, 2009). In the betting market, the instruments traded are bets. Similar
to conventional assets and derivatives in financial markets, a bet is a state-contingent
contractual claim on a future cash flow. This cash flow is determined by two parameters:
(i) the outcome of the underlying event, such as a horse race, a soccer match or a political
election, and (ii) the price of the contract, i.e., the posted odds (Sauer, 1998). A common
betting type is fixed-odds betting, where the cash flow of a successful bet is determined
ex-ante. For example, if the decimal odds on the home team of a soccer match are 1.40, a
one-dollar wager pays ✩1.40 and yields a return of 40% if the home team wins. Therefore,
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higher odds imply a higher bettor return in the case of success but an accordingly lower
winning probability.
Financial markets are classified as either quote-driven, where trades must be fulfilled
through intermediaries, or order-driven, where trading is based on the direct interaction of
market participants (De Jong & Rindi, 2009). Similar to market makers in quote-driven
financial markets, bookmakers in the betting industry serve as intermediaries between
buyers (bettors willing to place a bet on a particular outcome) and sellers (bettors willing
to place a bet on the opposite outcome). The bookmakers unilaterally determine the
odds for a given betting contract at which they are willing to accept bets (Harris, 2003).
In this market, the bookmakers guarantee sufficient liquidity. The odds quoted by the
bookmakers already contain a commission (i.e., the ‘overround’) that compensates them
for providing liquidity and bearing the risk of unfavorable outcomes. Examples of well-
established bookmakers are Bwin, Ladbrokes, Tipico and William Hill.
Since 2000, betting exchanges have evolved in the betting industry. They operate
as order-driven markets in which buyers and sellers trade directly with each other in a
continuous double auction without the intermediation of market makers. In this market
structure, bettors can provide or take liquidity. Bettors who provide liquidity post a
limit order that indicates the terms at which they will trade. A transaction only takes
place if there is a corresponding order on the opposite side of the market. Otherwise,
the limit order is placed in the limit order book until it is either executed or cancelled.
Bettors who take liquidity submit a market order that is immediately executed at the best
odds available (Harris, 2003; De Jong & Rindi, 2009). Betting exchanges facilitate trading
activity by providing an electronic platform on which supply and demand are matched and
collect a commission on the net winnings of successful bets (Franck, Verbeek & Nüesch,
2013). Examples of larger betting exchanges are Betfair, BETDAQ and Matchbook.
Previous studies that compare the two market structures within the betting industry
suggest that the betting exchange market is superior to the traditional bookmaking market
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in several ways. Koning and van Velzen (2009) argue that a fundamental advantage of
betting exchanges is that they do not take any trading position. Because betting exchanges
simply charge the winners a certain commission, a steady flow of income independent
from the match outcomes is guaranteed. This exposes betting exchanges to minimal risk.
In contrast, traditional bookmakers are continuously exposed to risk, as they can lose
substantial amounts of money when they misjudge the probabilities or when they are
over-exposed to an event that occurs (Davies et al., 2005). Furthermore, bookmakers
need informed specialists who monitor the market and actively manage the odds. The
information costs of bookmakers are therefore considerably higher than those of betting
exchanges that simply provide a trading platform (Davies et al., 2005).
Empirical studies have found that prediction accuracy is higher in the order-driven
betting exchange market than in the quote-driven bookmaker market (Smith et al., 2006,
2009; Franck et al., 2010). Moreover, Croxson and Reade (2011) and Ozgit (2005) show
that bettors obtain higher net returns in the betting exchange market than in the book-
maker market. Given these advantages of the order-driven market, the ongoing success of
the quote-driven bookmaker market is surprising.
In this paper, we investigate a distinct source of competitive advantage of the quote-
driven market: the benefit that arises from the continuous provision of liquidity by the
bookmaker. According to the theoretical work of Demsetz (1968), a key function of market
makers in financial markets is the supply of immediacy by continuously quoting prices and
by providing liquidity to the asynchronous arrival of orders from investors. The models of
Garbade and Silber (1979) and Grossman and Miller (1988) show that the liquidity supply
of market makers reduces temporal imbalances in order flow and increases the rapidity of
exchange. By contrast, a lack of liquidity at the order-driven market leads to high bid
quotations and low ask quotations, which increases both transaction and waiting costs.
De Jong et al. (1995) and Huang and Stoll (1996, 2001) compare pure quote- and
order-driven financial markets and conclude that transaction costs are generally lower in
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order-driven markets. Other financial studies investigate hybrid markets in which liquid-
ity is provided by market makers and by limit orders submitted by market participants
simultaneously (De Jong & Rindi, 2009). Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) analyse market
makers in the hybrid NYSE market. Because market makers participate more when bid-
ask spreads are high, Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) conclude that the market maker is a
liquidity provider of last resort. Friederich and Payne (2007) analyse the order flow in the
London Stock Exchange (LSE) at which investors are free to choose between the order-
driven or the quote-driven execution modes. Their results demonstrate that the liquidity
supplied by intermediaries is increasingly utilized when execution risk is high due to large
trades or high market volume. Furthermore, the authors show that the share of order flow
migrates to the market maker segment when the bid-ask spreads of the limit order book
are high. Venkataraman and Waisburd (2007) investigate firms that have chosen a des-
ignated market maker at the otherwise order-driven Paris Bourse. Their results suggest
that the market maker resolves temporal imbalances in order flow by selectively providing
liquidity when the public supply is insufficient. Thus, by maintaining a market presence,
the market maker can improve the terms of trade offered by public limit orders.
However, comparative investigations of financial market structures are limited in two
ways. First, comparisons of pure quote-driven and order-driven structures are often accom-
panied by differences in underlying assets and/or differences in macroeconomic conditions.
Thus, a clear benchmark of market quality is missing (Madhavan, 2000). Second, hybrid
structures combine both elements of order- and quote-driven markets with complex inter-
actions and trading rules. For example, the liquidity supply of the market maker at the
NYSE is constrained in a number of ways, and at the Paris Bourse, only large trades can
be executed with the market maker (Friederich & Payne, 2007).
In the betting industry, by contrast, identical betting contracts are traded simultan-
eously on well-distinct market structures, which allows a proper comparison of market
structures and a clean investigation of the liquidity advantage of the quote-driven market.
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3 Sample and Data
Our main data set consists of decimal betting odds from the bookmaker Tipico and the
betting exchange Betfair on the winner betting contracts on home win, draw and away win
of soccer matches. Soccer is by far the most important sports betting market, accounting
for about 70% of the estimated ✩700bn generated by the betting industry each year (BBC,
2013). The bookmaker Tipico is one of the leading bookmakers in Europe. Through its
on-line portal and more than 1,000 betting shops across Europe, the company offered
odds on 1.76 million betting contracts and handled over 790 million bets from customers
in 2012 (Tipico Co. Ltd., 2013). Betfair is the largest and most liquid betting exchange.
In 2012, the betting exchange had over 4 million registered customers and processed more
than 7 million transactions on an average day, which is more than the transactions of all
European stock exchanges combined (Betfair, 2012).
The data set is provided by Tipico and covers 17,410 matches from over 400 leagues
across more than 60 countries played between March 2012 and October 2012. Within each
country, we observe matches from different divisions. For example, the data from Eng-
land include matches from the Premier League (level 1), Championship League (level 2),
League One (level 3), League Two (level 4), Conference National (level 5) and Conference
North/South (level 6). Additionally, the data set also covers transnational tournaments
such as the UEFA Champions League or Europa League, World Cup qualification matches
and international friendlies. The lion’s share of matches were played in European leagues,
accounting for over 12,000 matches.
For each match and event, the data include the pre-play history of bookmaker and
betting exchange odds, which were simultaneously recorded and thus have a time-stamp
accurate to the second.1 The order book of betting exchanges usually displays both back
and lay odds, where back odds refer to the odds of a bet on a certain outcome, whereas
1The frequency at which the odds were collected depended on the time remaining until match start,
ranging from every 3 hours between 72 and 48 hours before match start to every 5 minutes during the
final 3 hours before match start. Matches with a pre-play history of less than 1 hour have been deleted
from the data set.
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lay odds refer to the odds of a bet against a certain outcome. We use the best, i.e.,
the highest, back odds from the exchange order book at each time point in our analyses,
because these odds correspond to the bookmakers’ (back) odds.2
As an example, Figure 1 shows the decimal odds information available for the home
win event bet from the match of Chelsea FC vs. Newcastle United played on May 2, 2012.





















−4000 −3000 −2000 −1000 0
Minutes before match start
Odds Tipico Odds Betfair
72 hours 48 hours 15 hours 6 hours 3 hours
Figure 1: Example decimal odds on home win for Chelsea FC vs. Newcastle United, May 2, 2012
Betfair exhibited a higher variation over time. This pattern is typical for many matches
in our data set: while the bookmaker odds changed about twice on average, the betting
exchange odds changed about 31 times on average.
2One could argue that the betting exchange market equilibrium odds are neither the back nor the lay
odds but the matched odds. However, a fair comparison between market structures should take the best
available market order odds into account, i.e., the highest back odds at the betting exchange and the
odds quoted by the bookmaker.
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In total, we observed 1,873,831 pairs of odds from the bookmaker and the betting
exchange for each of the three events home win, draw and away win. The data set also
contains the cumulative trading volume at the betting exchange for each match and time
point of the odds collection. The cumulative trading volume is the amount of money that
has been matched since the beginning of the pre-play period.
Whereas our betting exchange Betfair is by far the largest betting exchange and thus
likely to be representative for the betting exchange market, the bookmaker Tipico is
smaller than other major bookmakers such asWilliam Hill or Ladbrokes and may therefore
not be representative for the bookmaker market. To test the robustness of our results,
we collected closing bookmaker odds, i.e., the last odds before match start, from up to
42 different bookmakers for a random subsample of 20% of the 17,410 matches from
www.oddsportal.com.3
4 Empirical Analysis
As identical betting contracts are offered on both market structures simultaneously, we
simply relate the odds of both market structures to each other. Thereby, higher odds are
more attractive for bettors. For the ease of interpretation, we convert the odds into prices,
which are the reciprocal of the odds (e.g., p = 1
1.40
≈ 0.714). These prices represent the
amount of money a bettor has to invest in order to collect ✩1 for a winning bet (Forrest
& Simmons, 2008).
394 matches were missing on oddsportal.com. The subsample therefore consists of 3,388 matches. As
oddsportal.com does not provide a pre-play history of bookmaker odds, we test the robustness of the
across-match analysis. The subsample includes odds from the following bookmakers: 10Bet, 12Bet,
188BET, 5Dimes, 888sport, Bestbet, Bet365, Bet-at-home, Betclic, Betfred, BetGun, BetOnline, Bet-
safe, Betsson, BetVictor, Betway, BoyleSports, Bwin, Coral, Dafabet, DOXXbet, Expekt, Intertops, In-
terwetten, Island Casino, Jetbull, Ladbrokes, Leonbets, Luxbet, Marathonbet, Mybet, NordicBet, Noxwin,
Pinnacle, SBOBET, Sportingbet, Tipico, Titanbet, TonyBet, Unibe, William Hill and Youwin.
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For each match i, event e ∈ {home win, draw, away win} and time t before match





where oddsBM refers to the decimal odds quoted by the bookmaker. The bookmaker odds
already include a commission. Betting exchanges usually charge a commission on net
winnings that is not included in the odds offered. Hence, the net price at the betting











where oddsbackBE refers to the best decimal back odds and c refers to the commission. The
commission at Betfair varies between 2% and 5% on net winnings, contingent on the
betting activity of a bettor. Thereby, the commission decreases the money a bettor has
wagered in the past (Betfair, 2013b). In this paper, we employ the standard commission
of 5% to compute an upper (lower) bound for the prices (net bettor returns) from Betfair.4
Liquidity is an important characteristic of well-functioning markets and permits the
trading of large quantities quickly at low costs (Harris, 2003). While liquidity in the
quote-driven market is guaranteed by the bookmaker,5 liquidity in the order-driven market
depends on the order flow from market participants (De Jong & Rindi, 2009).
4It is reasonable to assume that most of the bettors betting at Betfair pay 5% in commission, as a
discount in the commission requires very high betting activity. According to the Betfair commission
rule, a bettor has to wager at least ✩112,500 per week in order to reach the 2% commission rate (Betfair,
2013b). Nevertheless, all our results are robust to the use of any Betfair commission between 2% and
5%.
5One might worry that liquidity at the bookmaker is restricted by maximum stake limits. Indeed, book-
makers limit the maximal winning amount per betting contract: day or week. For example, the maximum
winning amount per bet is ↔500,000, ↔100,000 and e100,000 for the bookmakers William Hill, Ladbrokes
and Tipico, respectively. For an average bettor, these limits are sufficiently high. According to the on-
line betting survey from Merrion Stockbrokers (2010), over 95% of the bettors stake less than ✩250 on
average, and 75% of the bettors stake less than ✩25 on average.
12












A common measure of liquidity in financial studies is the quoted spread (e.g., Amihud
& Mendelson, 1986). The quoted spread is the difference between the lowest ask price
and the highest bid price (Chordia, Roll & Subrahmanyam, 2008). A small quoted spread
indicates high market liquidity because the transaction costs are lower. We calculate the










where oddsback refers to the best ask price, and oddslay refers to the best bid price available
at the betting exchange.
A second common measure of liquidity in financial studies is the trading volume (e.g.,
Elyasiani, Hauser & Lauterbach, 2000; Chordia, Roll & Subrahmanyam, 2001; Hasbrouck
& Seppi, 2001). We therefore use the cumulative trading volume, i.e., the amount of
money that has been matched since the beginning of the pre-play period at the betting
exchange, as a second measure of liquidity.
Figure 2a displays the average bookmaker and betting exchange prices as a function
of the average quoted spread for home win events at the betting exchange, and Figure 2b
displays the prices as a function of the cumulative trading volume for home win events at
the betting exchange. Both figures show that liquidity at the betting exchange increases
the average price at the bookmaker market and decreases the average price at the bet-
ting exchange. If the betting exchange market is illiquid (i.e., high quoted spread, low
cumulative trading volume), the bookmaker market offers significantly lower prices than
the betting exchange. However, if the betting exchange market is liquid (i.e., low quoted
spread, high cumulative trading volume), the betting exchange offers significantly lower
prices than the bookmaker market. If the quoted spread is 0.044 and the cumulative
trading volume is ↔23,438 at the betting exchange, both markets offer the same prices
on average. If liquidity at the betting exchange exceeds these threshold values, the bet-
ting exchange offers lower prices. Otherwise, the bookmaker market offers lower prices
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Figure 2: Prices and bettor returns as a function of liquidity measures
for bettors. Similarly, Figure 2c and Figure 2d show that bettor returns are significantly
higher at the bookmaker market when liquidity is low at the betting exchange. However,
as bettor returns are still n gative on average, bookmakers are able to generate positive
profits.
Taken together, Figure 2 indicates that the bookmaker and the betting exchange prices
and bettor returns both but differently react to the liquidity at the betting exchange. The
following econometric models examine the influence of liquidity at the betting exchange
on the bookmaker and betting exchange prices and on bettor returns in more detail.
As a dependent variable, we use an indicator variable LOW BM that equals 1 if the
bookmaker offers a lower price than the betting exchange and 0 otherwise. Thus, when
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LOW BM equals 1, the bookmaker market provides higher bettor returns if the event
occurs. Our main independent variable is the liquidity at the betting exchange, measured
by either the quoted spread (QSPR) or the log cumulative trading volume (LnV OL). As
we have longitudinal data on matched bookmaker-betting exchange prices, we run four
different regressions: (i) a pooled LPM, (ii) a LPM with one randomly chosen observation
per match, (iii) a fixed-effects LPM, and (iv) an Arellano-Bond dynamic panel GMM
model.6
The pooled LPM and the LPM with one randomly chosen observation per match
analyse the relationship between liquidity and bookmakers versus betting exchange pricing
using across-match variation, whereas the fixed-effects LPM and the Arellano-Bond model
analyse this relationship using within-match variation. Because liquidity at the betting
exchange tends to increase in the pre-play period and because incoming match-relevant
information may differently influence the bookmakers and betting exchange’s pricing, we
include a full set of dummies for each hour in the pre-play period of a match as controls in
all of our models. In the across-match analyses, we additionally include league dummies
to control for unobserved league-level factors that may correlate with the liquidity at
the betting exchange and differential pricing at the bookmaker and the betting exchange
market. To take into account that the liquidity at the betting exchange at t could be
influenced by the relative prices at t − 1, the Arellano-Bond model additionally includes
a lagged dependent variable as a control variable.
Table 1 shows the coefficient estimates and heteroskedasticity-consistent standard er-
rors clustered at the match level in parentheses for home win bets. Panel A displays the
across-match results and Panel B the within-match results. The results for away win and
draw bets are virtually the same (see Table A.1 and Table A.2 in the Appendix).
6Our results are robust to the use of (fixed-effects) logit models. We prefer the linear model as a main
specification because observations with no within-group variation in the dependent variable are dropped
from fixed-effects logit models, which changes the interpretation and the generalization of the results. In
addition, unlike with linear models, pooled logit estimates cannot be directly compared with those from
a fixed-effects model because including fixed effects in a non-linear model would change the estimates
even if the fixed effects were independent of the variables of interest (Norton, 2012).
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Table 1: Analysis of prices for home win events
Panel A: Across-match analysis
Dependent variable: LOW BM (1/0)
Pooled LPM Random time point LPM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
QSPR 0.964*** 0.964***
(0.017) (0.030)
LnV OL -0.046*** -0.046***
(0.001) (0.002)
Hourly dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
League dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 19.68% 18.91% 22.01% 21.21%
N 1,873,831 1,873,831 17,410 17,410
N of groups 17,410 17,410
Panel B: Within-match analysis
Dependent variable: LOW BM (1/0)
Fixed-effects LPM Arellano-Bond GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
QSPR 0.808*** 1.050***
(0.019) (0.007)
LnV OL -0.043*** -0.020***
(0.001) (0.001)
LOW BMt−1 0.727*** 0.791***
(0.001) (0.001)
Hourly dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 overall 11.19% 12.12%
N 1,873,831 1,873,831 1,839,011 1,839,011
N of groups 17,410 17,410 17,410 17,410
Notes: Panel A: Columns (1) and (2) report the coefficients estimated from a pooled LPM with
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the match level in parentheses. Columns (3)
and (4) report the results from a pooled LPM with one randomly chosen observation per match. Panel
B: Columns (1) and (2) report the coefficients estimated from a fixed-effects LPM with robust standard
errors. Columns (3) and (4) report the results from a Arellano-Bond dynamic panel GMM model. In all
models, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
The results in Panel A show that illiquidity at the betting exchange significantly in-
creases the probability that the bookmaker price is lower than the betting exchange price.
The bookmaker tends to offer lower prices in matches with a high quoted spread and a
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low cumulative trading volume. Whereas we pool all observations in Columns (1) and
(2), we only use a randomly chosen observation per match in Columns (3) and (4). The
magnitudes of the estimates are virtually the same, and all liquidity coefficients are still
statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, we find that when liquidity is low, book-
makers offer lower prices than betting exchanges.
Panel B of Table 1 shows the results of the within-match analyses that no longer use
liquidity and price differences across matches to identify the effects. In the fixed-effects
LPM models in Columns (1) and (2), we control for all time-constant match heterogeneity
and test how the relative pricing at the bookmaker and the betting exchange market
changes if liquidity changes. The results suggest that an increase in liquidity at the
betting exchange reduces the probability that the bookmaker offers a lower price.
As the relative prices in the recent past are likely to influence the liquidity at the bet-
ting exchange, Columns (3) and (4) of Panel B show the estimates of an Arellano-Bond
dynamic-panel GMM model that includes the lagged dependent variable as additional
control variable. Here again, liquidity at the betting exchange market decreases the prob-
ability that the bookmaker offers a lower price than the betting exchange.
To investigate the liquidity advantage of the quote-driven market further, we use the
net bettor returns from a one-unit wager placed at both the bookmaker market and the
betting exchange market as a de endent variable. As independent variables, we include an
indicator variable BM that equals 1 if the return corresponds to the bookmaker market
and 0 if the return corresponds to the betting exchange market, the centred liquidity
variables QSPRc or LnV OLc, and the interaction terms BM×QSPRc or BM×LnV OLc,
respectively.7 Here again, we use hourly dummies to control for time trends and league
dummies to control for time-constant league heterogeneity.
Table 2 shows the coefficient estimates for home win events from a pooled OLS model,
an OLS model with a randomly chosen pair of returns per match and a fixed-effects OLS
7We mean-center the variables QSPR and LnV OL to get a meaningful interpretation of the coefficients
when an interaction term is included (Wooldridge, 2012).
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Table 2: Analysis of bettor returns for home win events
Dependent variable: bettor return
Pooled OLS Random time point OLS Fixed-effects OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BM -0.006 -0.006 -0.011 -0.011 -0.006 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006)
QSPRc -0.656*** -0.739*** -0.602***
(0.052) (0.083) (0.029)
BM ×QSPRc 0.602*** 0.584*** 0.605***
(0.036) (0.062) (0.036)
LnV OLc 0.017*** 0.018** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.001)
BM × LnV OLc -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.013***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.001)
Hourly dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
League dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 4.25% 4.17% 5.77% 5.68% 0.17% 0.06%
N 3,747,662 3,747,662 34,820 34,820 3,747,662 3,747,662
N of groups 17,410 17,410 17,410 17,410
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the coefficients estimated from a pooled OLS model. Columns (3)
and (4) report the results from a pooled OLS model with one randomly chosen observation per match.
Columns (5) and (6) report the coefficients estimated from a fixed-effects OLS model. All standard errors
reported in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-consistent and clustered at the match level. In all models,
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
model.8 The insignificant BM dummy shows that bettor returns are not generally lower
at the bookmaker market than at the betting exchange market. The significantly negative
effect of the quoted spread (QSPRc) and the significantly positive effect of cumulative
trading volume (LnV OLc) indicate that liquidity at the betting exchange increases bet-
tor returns in general. The main variable of interest in Table 2 is the interaction term.
The interaction effects are significantly positive when using the quoted spread as an illi-
quidity measure and significantly negative when using the cumulative trading volume as
an liquidity measure. Thus, bettor returns at the bookmaker market are higher than at
the betting exchange market if liquidity at the betting exchange is low. This finding is
8Unfortunately, the estimation of an Arellano-Bond dynamic-panel GMM model is not suitable here, as
we have two return observations per time unit.
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consistent across all three regression specifications as well as for away win and draw bets
(see Table A.3 and Table A.4 in the Appendix). Moreover, the results are robust to the
use of net bettor returns based on a 2% betting exchange commission and to the use of a
Tobit model.9
In the following we test whether the results in Table 1 and Table 2 based on prices
from the bookmaker Tipico are representative for the entire bookmaker market. To do
so, we compare the betting exchange prices to the prices from the five major bookmakers
Bet365, Ladbrokes, William Hill, Pinnacle, and Bwin and to an average bookmaker price
from up to 42 different bookmakers, using a random subsample of 20% of all matches in
the main data set. As the bookmakers do not offer odds on all matches in our subsample
the number of observations varies between 2,088 (Pinnacle) and 3,334 (Bwin).
As in the main analysis, we first investigate the effect of liquidity on the difference
in prices by using the indicator variable LOW BM as the dependent variable and our
liquidity measures as the main independent variables.10 Panel A of Table 3 shows that
the coefficient of QSPR is significantly positive for all bookmakers and that the coefficient
value for Tipico prices, though its best fit is lower than those for the average bookmaker
and four of the five major bookmakers, is consistent with all these within one standard
deviation. Thus, illiquidity at the betting exchange significantly increases the probability
that the bookmaker price is lower than the betting exchange price for bookmakers in
general, not just for Tipico.
Panel B of Table 3 uses the cumulative trading volume LnV OL at the betting exchange
as liquidity measure. Here again, we find that liquidity at the betting exchange affects
the probability that the bookmaker price is lower than the betting exchange price. The
coefficients of LnV OL are negative and statistically significant when using the prices of the
five major bookmakers and when using an average of the prices from up to 42 different
9The fixed-effects Tobit specification is not feasible as there is no sufficient statistic allowing the fixed-
effects to be conditioned out of the likelihood (StataCorp, 2015).
10As in the main analysis, we include league dummies. Because the subsample only considers closing
bookmaker odds, i.e., the last odds before match start, we do not need to include time dummies.
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Table 3: Subsample analysis of prices for home win events
Panel A: QSPR
Dependent variable: LOW BM (1/0)
Tipico Bet365 Ladbrokes W. Hill Pinnacle Bwin Avg. BM
QSPR 2.385*** 2.207*** 2.972*** 2.868*** 2.630*** 2.594*** 2.729***
(0.319) (0.329) (0.498) (0.766) (0.650) (0.369) (0.376)
League dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 18.90% 22.13% 25.02% 17.71% 14.77% 21.38% 27.29%
N 3,388 3,329 2,822 2,310 2,088 3,334 3,388
Panel B: LnV OL
Dependent variable: LOW BM (1/0)
Tipico Bet365 Ladbrokes W. Hill Pinnacle Bwin Avg. BM
LnV OL -0.031*** -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.019** -0.017* -0.036*** -0.042***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005)
League dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 16.64% 19.91% 21.96% 16.66% 14.23% 18.84% 24.12%
N 3,388 3,329 2,822 2,310 2,088 3,334 3,388
Notes: The table shows the coefficients for QSPR (Panel A) and LnV OL (Panel B) estimated from an
LPM for different major bookmakers and the average bookmaker (Avg. BM ), which uses the average of
prices from up to 42 different bookmakers. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are displayed in
parentheses. In all models, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
bookmakers. Moreover, magnitudes of the coefficients are similar across the different
models. The results of Table 3 are robust to the use of logit models and are virtually the
same for away win and draw bets (see Table A.5 and Table A.6 in the Appendix).
Next, we replicate the regression specifications of the bettor return for our subsample
and display the results in Table 4. In Panel A, the interaction effects of BM × QSPRc
are significantly positive, independent of whether the bettor returns of Tipico, the returns
of other major bookmakers or the average returns from up to 42 different bookmakers are
considered. Thus, the bettor returns are higher at the bookmaker market when illiquidity
at the betting exchange is high. In Panel B, the interaction effects of BM × LnV olc are
negative and statistically significant when using the average bettor returns from up to
42 bookmakers and when using the bettor returns of any of the major bookmakers, with
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the exception of William Hill. In the case of William Hill, the interaction effect is also
negative and only marginally insignificant (p-value = 0.126). The results for away win
and draw bets are virtually the same (see Table A.7 and Table A.8 in the Appendix).
Table 4: Subsample analysis of bettor returns for home win events
Panel A: QSPR
Dependent variable: bettor return
Tipico Bet365 Ladbrokes W. Hill Pinnacle Bwin Avg. BM
BM -0.028*** -0.023*** -0.046*** -0.035*** 0.008 -0.033*** -0.031***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
QSPRc -1.037** -1.000* 0.050 0.005 0.029 -1.163** -1.034**
(0.515) (0.534) (0.811) (1.332) (1.670) (0.544) (0.511)
BM ×QSPRc 0.778*** 0.738*** 0.876*** 0.555*** 0.422* 0.754** 0.744***
(0.190) (0.180) (0.303) (0.153) (0.234) (0.218) (0.175)
League dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 10.62% 10.74% 11.13% 10.83% 11.40% 10.66% 10.64%
N 6,776 6,658 5,644 4,620 4,176 6,668 6,776
Panel B: LnV OL
Dependent variable: bettor return
Tipico Bet365 Ladbrokes W. Hill Pinnacle Bwin Avg. BM
BM -0.028*** -0.023*** -0.049*** -0.037*** 0.008** -0.033*** -0.031***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
LnV OL 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.011 0.018 0.004 0.002
(0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.024) (0.014) (0.014)
BM × LnV OLc -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.003 -0.004* -0.007*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
League dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 10.57% 10.70% 11.11% 10.83% 11.40% 10.59% 10.59%
N 6,776 6,658 5,644 4,620 4,176 6,668 6,776
Notes: The table shows the coefficients for QSPR (Panel A) and LnV OL (Panel B) estimated from an
OLS regression model for different major bookmakers and the average bookmaker (Avg. BM ), which uses
the average of bettor returns from up to 42 different bookmakers. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors clustered at the match level are displayed in parentheses. In all models, *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
To sum up, not only Tipico but all other major bookmakers benefit from a liquidity
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advantage and offer lower prices and higher bettor returns than the betting exchange when
the liquidity at the betting exchange is low.
5 Conclusion
Due to less operational risk, lower information costs and higher prediction accuracy, bet-
ting exchanges are considered to be a superior business model to traditional bookmaking
(e.g., Davies et al., 2005; Koning & van Velzen, 2009). Nevertheless, bookmakers continue
to be successful. This paper argues that the liquidity advantage of the bookmaker market
helps to explain the puzzling co-existence of bookmakers and betting exchanges in the
betting industry.
Both across- and within-match analyses demonstrate that the liquidity at the betting
exchange significantly influences the bookmaker’s and the betting exchange’s prices. We
find that bookmaker odds are higher than those of the betting exchange if the cumulative
trading volume at the betting exchange is less than ↔23,400 and/or the quoted spread at
the betting exchange is higher than 0.044 on average. Our results imply that a lack of
liquidity at the betting exchange causes large gaps between bid and ask prices and thus
higher betting exchange prices than bookmaker prices. Analyses of bettor returns confirm
that bettors obtain higher returns at the bookmaker market than at the betting exchange
market if liquidity at the betting exchange is low. Thus, the guaranteed liquidity provision
at the bookmaker market is particularly valuable in periods in which liquidity is low at
the betting exchange. Altogether, our paper shows that the order-driven betting exchange
structure is not generally superior to the quote-driven bookmaker structure, as the active
management of the sportsbook offers a distinct liquidity advantage, which helps to explain
the ongoing coexistence of the two market structures.
Of course, the liquidity advantage is only one explanation for the coexistence of the
market structures in the betting industry. Another advantage of the bookmaker is rooted
in his profit-maximizing response to incoming betting demand. When the incoming volume
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demand is asymmetrically distributed due to the sentimental preferences of bettors, book-
makers can increase their profits by distorting their odds (Levitt, 2004; Forrest & Sim-
mons, 2008; Franck, Verbeek & Nüesch, 2011). Croxson and Reade (2011) hypothesize
that bookmakers continue to be successful because bettors face learning costs when switch-
ing to the betting exchange structure. The exchange interface, with its limit order book,
different odds and the options to back (i.e., betting on a certain outcome) or lay (i.e., bet-
ting against a certain outcome) a bet, may discourage bettors from switching the market
structure. Bookmakers also offer incentives such as free bets to dissuade customers from
leaving. Franck et al. (2013) show that bookmakers tend to offer higher odds than the
betting exchange as an element of their promotional activities to attract new customers.
Once bettors have opened an account, switching costs cause them to to stick with the
given bookmaker, even under unfavorable conditions.
Our analysis sheds some light on the recent shift of financial markets into hybrid
structures. The London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the Nasdaq market, for example,
moved from quote-driven systems to a hybrid market structure, at which the order book
is supplemented by market makers (Friederich & Payne, 2007). Furthermore, the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is characterized by elements of both market structures
(Madhavan, 2000). Empirical financial studies suggest that market makers are particularly
valuable in hybrid structures when liquidity at the order book is low (e.g., Madhavan &
Sofianos, 1998; Friederich & Payne, 2007; Venkataraman & Waisburd, 2007). As such,
the hybrid market structure combines the advantages of both the quote-driven and order-
driven structures. This might be one of the reasons why Betfair has started a sportsbook
offering quoted fixed odds in addition to the exchange-based odds as of February 2013
(Betfair, 2013a), essentially moving to a hybrid market structure.
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Table A.1: Analysis of prices for away win events
Panel A: Across-match analysis
Dependent variable: LOW BM (1/0)
Pooled LPM Random time point LPM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
QSPR 0.939*** 0.958***
(0.016) (0.039)
LnV OL -0.052*** -0.054***
(0.001) (0.002)
Hourly dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
League dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 23.16% 23.34% 25.23% 25.58%
N 1,873,831 1,873,831 17,410 17,410
N of groups 17,410 17,410
Panel B: Within-match analysis
Dependent variable: LOW BM (1/0)
Fixed-effects LPM Arellano-Bond GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
QSPR 0.794*** 1.025***
(0.018) (0.006)
LnV OL -0.049*** -0.026***
(0.001) (0.0005)
LOW BMt−1 0.714*** 0.780***
(0.001) (0.001)
Hourly dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 overall 11.50% 15.05%
N 1,873,831 1,873,831 1,839,011 1,839,011
N of groups 17,410 17,410 17,410 17,410
Notes: Panel A: Columns (1) and (2) report the coefficients estimated from a pooled LPM with
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the match level in parentheses. Columns (3)
and (4) report the results from a pooled LPM with one randomly chosen observation per match. Panel
B: Columns (1) and (2) report the coefficients estimated from a fixed-effects LPM with robust standard
errors. Columns (3) and (4) report the results from a Arellano-Bond dynamic panel GMM model. In all
models, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table A.2: Analysis of prices for draw events
Panel A: Across-match analysis
Dependent variable: LOW BM (1/0)
Pooled LPM Random time point LPM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
QSPR 1.058*** 1.166***
(0.018) (0.034)
LnV OL -0.068*** -0.072***
(0.001) (0.002)
Hourly dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
League dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 29.89% 32.41% 31.69% 34.39%
N 1,873,831 1,873,831 17,410 17,410
N of groups 17,410 17,410
Panel B: Within-match analysis
Dependent variable: LOW BM (1/0)
Fixed-effects LPM Arellano-Bond GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
QSPR 0.844*** 1.124***
(0.020) (0.003)
LnV OL -0.064*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001)
LOW BMt−1 0.705*** 0.932***
(0.001) (0.003)
Hourly dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 overall 13.76% 20.60%
N 1,873,831 1,873,831 1,839,011 1,839,011
N of groups 17,410 17,410 17,410 17,410
Notes: Panel A: Columns (1) and (2) report the coefficients estimated from a pooled LPM with
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the match level in parentheses. Columns (3)
and (4) report the results from a pooled LPM with one randomly chosen observation per match. Panel
B: Columns (1) and (2) report the coefficients estimated from a fixed-effects LPM with robust standard
errors. Columns (3) and (4) report the results from a Arellano-Bond dynamic panel GMM model. In all
models, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table A.3: Analysis of bettor returns for away win events
Dependent variable: bettor return
Pooled OLS Random time point OLS Fixed-effects OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BM -0.004** -0.004** -0.006** -0.005* -0.004** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
QSPRc -0.750*** -0.747*** -0.819***
(0.045) (0.069) (0.040)
BM ×QSPRc 0.829*** 0.824*** 0.829***
(0.036) (0.055) (0.039)
LnV OLc 0.002*** 0.009 0.015***
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001)
BM × LnV OLc -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.017***
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
Hourly dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
League dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 2.78% 2.69% 3.33% 3.22% 0.15% 0.03%
N 3,747,662 3,747,662 34,820 34,820 3,747,662 3,747,662
N of groups 17,410 17,410 17,410 17,410
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the coefficients estimated from a pooled OLS. Columns (3) and (4)
report the results from a pooled OLS with one randomly chosen observation per match. Columns (5) and
(6) report the coefficients estimated from a fixed-effects OLS. All standard errors reported in parentheses
are heteroscedasticity-consistent and clustered at the match level. In all models, *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table A.4: Analysis of bettor returns for draw events
Dependent variable: bettor return
Pooled OLS Random time point OLS Fixed-effects OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BM 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
QSPRc -0.870*** -0.890*** -0.829***
(0.049) (0.076) (0.036)
BM ×QSPRc 0.847*** 0.819*** 0.847***
(0.039) (0.054) (0.039)
LnV OLc 0.013*** 0.022*** 0.015***
(0.0005) (0.006) (0.001)
BM × LnV OLc -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.016***
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
Hourly dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
League dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 3.01% 2.88% 3.54% 3.43% 0.22% 0.06%
N 3,747,662 3,747,662 34,820 34,820 3,747,662 3,747,662
N of groups 17,410 17,410 17,410 17,410
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the coefficients estimated from a pooled OLS. Columns (3) and (4)
report the results from a pooled OLS with one randomly chosen observation per match. Columns (5) and
(6) report the coefficients estimated from a fixed-effects OLS. All standard errors reported in parentheses
are heteroscedasticity-consistent and clustered at the match level. In all models, *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table A.5: Subsample analysis of prices for away win events
Panel A: QSPR
Dependent variable: LOW BM (1/0)
Tipico Bet365 Ladbr. W. Hill Pinnacle Bwin Avg. BM
QSPR 2.350*** 2.322*** 2.675*** 3.825*** 2.164*** 2.417*** 2.813***
(0.376) (0.351) (0.596) (0.571) (0.514) (0.414) (0.443)
League dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 21.19% 19.95% 23.11% 17.96% 14.59% 22.51% 31.86%
N 3,388 3,329 2,822 2,310 2,088 3,334 3,388
Panel B: LnV OL
Dependent variable: LOW BM (1/0)
Tipico Bet365 Ladbr. W. Hill Pinnacle Bwin Avg. BM
LnV OL -0.043*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.028*** -0.038*** -0.042*** -0.044***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
League dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 19.78% 18.27% 20.84% 15.46% 14.82% 20.81% 28.09%
N 3,388 3,329 2,822 2,310 2,088 3,334 3,388
Notes: The table shows the coefficients for QSPR (Panel A) and LnV OL (Panel B) estimated from an
LPM for different major bookmakers and the average bookmaker (Avg. BM ), which uses the average of
prices from up to 42 different bookmakers. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are displayed in
parentheses. In all models, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table A.6: Subsample analysis of prices for draw events
Panel A: QSPR
Dependent variable: LOW BM (1/0)
Tipico Bet365 Ladbr. W. Hill Pinnacle Bwin Avg. BM
QSPR 2.735*** 2.500*** 3.396*** 4.653*** 2.072** 2.697*** 2.835***
(0.343) (0.345) (0.500) (1.305) (1.017) (0.333) (0.443)
League dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 27.90% 22.68% 29.13% 22.67% 17.45% 34.45% 36.79%
N 3,388 3,329 2,822 2,310 2,088 3,334 3,388
Panel B: LnV OL
Dependent variable: LOW BM (1/0)
Tipico Bet365 Ladbr. W. Hill Pinnacle Bwin Avg. BM
LnV OL -0.057*** -0.063*** -0.047*** -0.035*** -0.046*** -0.050*** -0.060***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
League dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 26.06% 22.73% 25.50% 19.22% 18.37% 31.13% 34.11%
N 3,388 3,329 2,822 2,310 2,088 3,334 3,388
Notes: The table shows the coefficients for QSPR (Panel A) and LnV OL (Panel B) estimated from an
LPM for different major bookmakers and the average bookmaker (Avg. BM ), which uses the average of
prices from up to 42 different bookmakers. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are displayed in
parentheses. In all models, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table A.7: Subsample analysis of bettor returns for away win events
Panel A: QSPR
Dependent variable: bettor return
Tipico Bet365 Ladbr. W. Hill Pinnacle Bwin Avg. BM
BM -0.039*** -0.028*** -0.072*** -0.070*** 0.024*** -0.050*** -0.052***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
QSPRc -1.514*** -1.538*** -2.532*** -3.726*** -2.08 -1.497*** -1.034**
(0.552) (0.564) (0.767) (1.181) (1.311) (0.557) (0.547)
BM ×QSPRc 0.728*** 0.512*** 0.607*** 0.955*** 0.356 0.686*** 0.646***
(0.171) (0.125) (0.175) (0.260) (0.238) (0.140) (0.128)
League dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 8.65% 8.90% 8.58% 8.80% 9.76% 8.71% 8.66%
N 6,776 6,658 5,644 4,620 4,176 6,668 6,776
Panel B: LnV OL
Dependent variable: bettor return
Tipico Bet365 Ladbr. W. Hill Pinnacle Bwin Avg. BM
BM -0.039*** -0.028*** -0.071*** -0.072*** 0.025*** -0.051*** -0.052***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
LnV OL 0.005 0.002 0.018 0.017 -0.017 0.007 0.005
(0.017) (0.018) (0.022) (0.024) (0.030) (0.017) (0.017)
BM × LnV OLc -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.005* -0.011*** -0.010***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
League dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 8.58% 8.83% 8.45% 8.67% 9.74% 8.66% 8.60%
N 6,776 6,658 5,644 4,620 4,176 6,668 6,776
Notes: The table shows the coefficients for QSPR (Panel A) and LnV OL (Panel B) estimated from an
OLS regression model for different major bookmakers and the average bookmaker (Avg. BM ), which uses
the average of bettor returns from up to 42 different bookmakers. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors clustered at the match level are displayed in parentheses. In all models, *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table A.8: Subsample analysis of bettor returns for draw events
Panel A: QSPR
Dependent variable: bettor return
Tipico Bet365 Ladbr. W. Hill Pinnacle Bwin Avg. BM
BM -0.040*** -0.015*** -0.058*** -0.030** 0.080*** -0.054*** -0.047***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.013) (0.018) (0.005) (0.004)
QSPRc -1.492*** -1.032*** -1.635* 0.029 -1.383 -1.447*** -1.524***
(0.545) (0.586) (0.884) (1.559) (2.330) (0.548) (0.547)
BM ×QSPRc 1.020*** 1.032*** 1.109** 2.219** 4.150*** 1.083*** 1.043***
(0.299) (0.363) (0.543) (0.260) (1.255) (0.307) (0.302)
League dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 11.11% 10.65% 11.49% 11.35% 11.07% 10.93% 11.01%
N 6,776 6,658 5,644 4,620 4,176 6,668 6,776
Panel B: LnV OL
Dependent variable: bettor return
Tipico Bet365 Ladbr. W. Hill Pinnacle Bwin Avg. BM
BM -0.040*** -0.015*** -0.062*** -0.047*** 0.030*** -0.055*** -0.047***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
LnV OL 0.018 0.022 0.002 -0.014 -0.013 0.014 0.019
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.026) (0.031) (0.019) (0.019)
BM × LnV OLc -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
League dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 11.06% 10.61% 11.45% 11.33% 11.02% 10.88% 10.95%
N 6,776 6,658 5,644 4,620 4,176 6,668 6,776
Notes: The table shows the coefficients for QSPR (Panel A) and LnV OL (Panel B) estimated from an
OLS regression model for different major bookmakers and the average bookmaker (Avg. BM ), which uses
the average consisting of bettor returns from up to 42 different bookmakers. Heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors clustered at the match level are displayed in parentheses. In all models, *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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The Liquidity Advantage of the Quote-driven
Market: Evidence from the Betting Industry
Research highlights
❼ We investigate the advantage of guaranteed liquidity in the quote-driven market.
❼ We use matched panel data of 1.8 million bookmaker and betting exchange odds.
❼ The bookmaker offers higher odds when liquidity at the betting exchange is low.
❼ The findings help to explain the coexistence of quote- and order-driven markets.
Highlights
